Soviet Minister of Defense Klemit Voroshilov, in Moscow, handled many of the incoming military messages from Spain, as more than a third of the eighty-one published documents were addressed to him. Stalin, the real head of the Soviet Union, made one direct order to the Spanish government, on the conservative side.
After the bombing of the pocket battleship on (which enraged Hitler), Stalin said that the Spanish Republican air force should not bomb German or Italian vessels.
Kleber's report is dated 14 December 1937, which was probably when he began composing it, after his recall from Spain.
However, it apparently included diary material written at Spanish fronts. 363 indicates he may still have been writing after March 1938, because he mentions the and the Sudetenland problem.
is a recent addition to the continuing Yale series, "Annals of Communism," edited with the cooperation of Russian scholars in Moscow.
Professional historians concentrating on documents should consider postponing their reading of the lengthy (about 110 pages) introductory sections of until after they have read the eighty-one important Soviet documents in chronological order.
Mussolini dispatched about 74,300 men in Spain from August 1936 to the end of the war, with 48,000 in the "Volunteer Corps" (CTV) as of March 1937. About 6,000 Brigaders died (Doc.75) compared to 4,000 Italians, and 320 Germans.
Man for man the German military was the most efficient foreign unit in Spain, and the Brigade members shed the most blood.
There is ample room for others to mine the eighty-one documents for facts and to interpret them differently from Checa or from Radosh.
One point clarified is the importance of the International Brigades (IB) in upholding a military balance of power.